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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JACK V. WILKINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000941-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Wilkinson's conviction of 
possession or use of methamphetamine. This Court will reverse a jury's verdict only if the 
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so inconclusive or 
so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872,876-77 (Utah 
App. 1998). This issue was preserved in a Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. 212-217). 
l 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from 
a practicioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jack Wilkinson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr. after he was convicted of three controlled substance 
violations. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jack Wilkinson was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on August 
18, 1998 with the following criminal violations: possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); possession of 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 2). 
On May 26, 1999, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Anthony 
Schofield at which time Wilkinson was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding 
of probable cause and pleas of "not guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 64-65). 
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On November 18,1999, a jury trial was held with the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr., 
presiding (R. 90-91, ). Wilkinson was not present (R. 90-91, ). The jury convicted 
Wilkinson on all three counts (R. 122-24). 
After trial, Wilkinson, pro se, filed a motion to have Sid Unrau discharged as counsel 
and to have new counsel appointed (R. 145). The trial court granted Wilkinson's motion (R. 
152). James G. Clark was subsequently assigned to represent Wilkinson. 
On February 9, 2000, and May 16,2000, Wilkinson filed motions to arrest judgment 
(R. 156-64; 212-217). On June 22, 2000, Judge Harding, Sr., denied Wilkinson's second 
motion finding that the evidence established a sufficient nexus between Wilkinson and the 
drugs for the jury to find him guilty as charged (R. 228). 
After a competency evaluation, Wilkinson was sentenced on September 25,2000, to 
an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. 240-42). On 
October 24, 2000, Wilkinson, through current counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth 
District Court and this action commenced (R. 245). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Stephen Bullock 
Stephen Bullock testified that he has known Jack Wilkinson for 15-20 years (R. 260 
at 38). Bullock testified that in August of 1998 he was driving a work truck in which 
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Wilkinson was a passenger (R. 260 at 39-40,42). Bullock and Wilkinson had been in Orem 
at the home of Bullock's parents fixing his truck (R. 260 at 40). 
As they were approaching American Fork, a traffic stop was made on the truck (R. 
260 at 39). Bullock testified the officers believed that he was under the influence of drugs \ 
and performed field sobriety tests (R. 260 at 40). 
Bullock testified that there was a baggy with a small amount of methamphetamine, 
a spoon, syringes, and marijuana in the truck (R. 260 at 41). According to Bullock, the baggy 
with methamphetamine was found laying on the front seat R. 260 at 41). When Bullock was 
asked by the State whether Wilkinson was aware of the methamphetamine, Bullock 
responded "I don't know if I was even aware it was there. It was just a little bit left in a 
corner. I think it was mine, and it had just been in the vehicle without me knowing it was i 
even there" R. 260 at 41). Bullock testified that he did not believe that Wilkinson brought the 
methamphetamine into the truck (R. 260 at 43). 
Bullock testified that the spoon and the syringes were located underneath the 
passenger's seat (R. 260 at 41). Bullock testified that the spoon and the syringes were his 
(R. 260 at 43). Bullock also indicated that the marijuana belonged to Wilkinson (R. 260 at 
43). 
Bullock testified that when the officers approached the vehicle, Wilkinson threw 
"everything" into a bag under the seat in an effort to hide it "but when he got out [of the 
truck] he kicked it out on the ground" (R. 260 at 44). 
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Bullock denied any use of methamphetamine by himself or Wilkinson that day, but 
indicated that they had "smoked a marijuana joint earlier" (R. 2fi0 al 4 i -421. Bullock also 
testified that he and Wilkinson had usuJ lucihunipliciainme ap|>in\imaU'l\ M In nrs i-nrlm 
I I l i e n I k J » U < l l 4 . ) . ' ' • • ' - .•  •.:• -•' '•; <:.:• ;••-.. •
 ; •• . . . .. . . 
iestimony of James Bingham 
James Rbuiham " mty with the Utah Countv Shuii; , IHIKO, testitied tn , 
^ " H l ^ t o f j A . K ^ ' . ( K ^ l . d ^ l o ;\!.i : : , . I . . ! ' » ' ' ^ • i 
: , . o •
 U)on his arrival observed Shiverdecker order 
Wilkinson from the passenger side of the truck (R 26f• .ii 4 ^ Wilkinson was then placed 
in handcuffs and Bingham walked him,,, to his vchu In, sal W ilkinson duw n in llir passman 
« e : . ! . s J - ~ - • * • ' •» : • J • " ' • ^ ^ 
p.. i^ls (R. 260 at 4>,. bullock testified thai Wu^nson told he tlu* "he diiln i 
know anything, didn't know where the things came from, and that they must hi Bullock's" 
(R „ 260 at 49) Bingham lestilied thai Wilkinson did iiol smell oil dni}»s and tli.il nrd tives, 
, ^  _
 s} Ki K , : , haustion and other causes (R. 260 
at 50-51), 
Testimony of Owen Shiverdecker ,-,v •
 : 
bwenMii\erUeckei. a depiil \ w mill llir I H.tli t Vmiiih MIITIII" s Office testified that in 
Augu '^i * >f 19*>S he conduced a traffic slop on Bullock's truck between Pleasant Grove and 
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American Fork (R. 260 at 54-55). Shiverdecker spoke with Bullock, the driver, and had him 
perform field sobriety tests which Bullock failed (R. 260 at 55). 
Shiverdecker testified that he recognized Wilkinson, the passenger (R. 260 at 56). 
Wilkinson was "slumped over, kind of leaning against the side of the car" (R. 260 at 56). 
Shiverdecker testified that he shone his flashlight in the car and saw a syringe with 
an orange cap (R. 260 at 56). Shiverdecker then placed Bullock in handcuffs and took him 
out of the car (R. 260 at 57). Shiverdecker then approached the passenger side of the truck 
to retrieve the syringe and asked Wilkinson to step out of the vehicle (R. 260 at 57). When 
Wilkinson stepped out, he kicked a metal spoon, which had a burnt residue, and the syringe 
out onto the ground (R. 260 at 57). Shivedecker testified that this could have happened 
incidentally as Wilkinson exited the vehicle (R. 260 at 67). Wilkinson was placed in 
handcuffs (R. 260 at 58). Shiverdecker then searched Wilkinson and found a syringe in his 
pants pocket (R. 260 at 58). 
Shiverdecker then searched the truck (R. 260 at 59). In the truck, Shiverdecker found 
in the center of the passenger seat a "small baggy with a ziploc-type top" with a white 
granular powder approximately 1 inch in size (R. 260 at 59, 69). Shiverdecker also found 
a white paper sack under the seat that contained a number of syringes that were unused or 
recapped, a small baggy of marijuana, and one syringe approximately "a quarter full of a 
yellow substance, which appeared to be methamphetamine" (R. 260 at 59, 69). 
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Shiverdecker testified that the spoon, the baggy and the marijuana were sent to the 
crime lab (R. 260 at 66-67). The syringe with the yellow substance was not tested (R. 260 
at 71). Shiverdecker never saw Wilkinson exercise control over the the items in the bag (R. 
260 at 71). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wilkinson asserts that his conviction of possession/use of methamphetamine should 
be reversed for insufficient evidence because he was not observed actually using or 
possessing the drug; nor was there a sufficient nexus between him and the drug found in 
Bullock's truck to permit a factual inference, under a theory of constructive possession, that 
he had the power and the intent to exercise control over the-drug. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
WILKINSON KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY 
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE 
Wilkinson does not contest his convictions for possession of marijuana and possession 
of drug paraphernalia—both class B misdemeanors. However, Wilkinson asserts that the 
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that he possessed or 
used methamphetamine. This Court will reverse a jury's verdict only if the evidence, when 
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872,876-77 (Utah App. 1998). 
The chief element of possession or use of methamphetamine is that the defendant must 
"knowingly and intentionally" possess or use the drug. There is no evidence showing that 
Wilkinson had actual possession of methamphetamine-which in this case could only be 
possession of the 1 inch zip-loc baggie found by officers on the seat of the truck, or possibly 
the spoon which had a methamphetamine residue (although Wilkinson asserts that the spoon, 
because it only had a burnt residue, is really only paraphernalia). Nor did law enforcement 
personnel observe Wilkson actually use methamphetamine. Accordingly, for the jury to 
convict Wilkinson of the crime for which he was charged it had to do so under a theory of 
"constructive possession." See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79111,985 P.2d 91 Inciting State 
v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
To prove that Wilkinson constructively possessed methamphetamine, it is "necessary 
that 'there [be] a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise control over the drug.'" 
Layman, 1999 UT 79113 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319). In other words, there "must be 
facts which show that the accused intended to use the drugs as his own." Id. 
The determination of constructive possession is "highly fact-sensitive". Layman, 
1999 UT 79114. While Utah courts in State v. Fox and State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah 
App. 1991), set forth factors which aid the determination of constructive possession, these 
factors "are factors that are particularly relevant to the specific context in which those cases 
arose" and "are not universally pertinent factors" nor are they "legal elements of constructive 
possession in any context." Layman, 1999 UT 79 at 114. The legal test for determining 
constructive possession is whether "there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the 
drug to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise 
control over the drug.'" Layman, 1999 UT 79115 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318). Moreover, 
"a guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only 
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71114, 21 
P.3d 1139 (quoting both State v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at 15, 975 P.2d 501; and State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
In State v. Layman, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Layman 
exercised power and control over drugs that were found on the person of a passenger in his 
vehicle. The facts indicate that Layman had probably used methamphetamine at some point 
before the stop of his vehicle. 1999 UT 71 at 14,116. Layman had needle marks on his arm. 
1999 UT 71 at 19. Layman's behavior was erratic after the stop: he appeared upset, fidgety 
and had red, watery, eyes. 1999 UT App 71 at 16,116. Layman knew that the passenger had 
drugs on her person as evidenced by his signal to her that she not consent to a search of the 
pouch she was wearing. 1999 UT App 71 at 18. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed this Court's reversal of Layman's conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence: 
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"The only fact tending to prove [Layman's] control over [the passenger] is that she looked 
at him when the deputy requested to see the pouch and that [Layman] shook his head in a 
negative fashion. This simply is not enough. All the other evidence in this case does nothing 
to address this critical factual issue. Neither her presence in his vehicle, his erratic behavior 
after the traffic stop, nor his use of drugs at some earlier time make up for this lack of 
evidence." 1999 UT 71 at 116. 
Wilkinson asserts that his case is really Layman in reverse. Instead of the inquiry 
being on the driver's constructive possession of drugs that were under the control of the 
passenger this case focuses on whether Wilkinson, the passenger, exercised control over 
drugs which belonged to the driver, Stephen Bullock. The critical facts of this case, as 
marshaled in Appellant's Statement of Facts, are as follows: Wilkinson was a passenger in 
Bullock's truck (R. 260 at 39-40, 42). Bullock and Wilkinson had smoked marijuana 
together earlier in the day and had used methamphetamine the previous day (R. 260 at 41-
42). 
Bullock was stopped by a deputy with the Utah County Sheriff s office on suspension 
of driving under the influence of drug or alcohol (R. 260 at 39). When the officer 
approached the vehicle, Bullock testified that Wilkinson threw "everything" into a bag under 
the seat (R. 260 at 44). Bullock failed field sobriety tests (R. 260 at 40, 55). 
A syringe was observed on the floor of the truck by Deputy Shiverdecker (R. 260 at 
56). When Wilkinson was told to exit the truck, he kicked a spoon and the syringe onto the 
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street (R. 260 at 57). Deputy Shiverdecker admitted that Wilkinson's contact with the spoon 
and the syringe could have been incidental. (R. 260 at 67). 
A syringe was found in Wilkinson's pants pocket (R. 260 at 58). In addition, 
Wilkinson was observed to have red eyes, dilated pupils and slurred speech (R. 260 at 50-51). 
Wilkinson did not, however, smell of drugs (R. 260 at 50-51). 
During a search of the truck, Deputy Shiverdecker found in the center of the truck's 
bench seat a 1 inch "baggy with a ziploc-type top" with a white granular powder that later 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 260 at 59, 66-67, 69). Shiverdecker also found a 
white paper sack under the seat (towards the passenger side) that contained syringes and a 
small baggy of marijuana (R. 260 at 59,69). At trial, Bullock testified that the spoon and the 
syringes found in the truck belonged to him (R. 260 at 43). Bullock also testified that the 
marijuana belonged to Wilkinson (R. 260 at 43). In relation to the linch baggy of 
methamphetamine, Bullock testified: "I don't know if I was even aware it was there. It was 
just a little bit left in a corner. I think it was mine, and had just been in the vehicle without 
me knowing it was even there" (R. 260 at 41). Bullock also testified that he did not believe 
that Wilkinson had brought the baggy into the truck (R. 260 at 43). 
The only facts tending to prove Wilkinson's control over any methamphetamine are 
that he (possibly incidentally) kicked the spoon with residue from the truck onto the street 
as he was exiting the truck and that the 1 inch baggy was found on the truck seat where he 
and Bullock had been sitting. Wilkinson asserts, that like Layman, "this simply is not 
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enough" particularly when Bullock-the State's witness-testified that the spoon, and probably 
the baggy, were his. 1999 UT 71 at|16. Wilkinson, similarly asserts that like Layman, "all 
the other evidence in this case does nothing to address [the] critical issue" of whether he 
constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in Bullock's truck. Finally, Wilkinson 
asserts that like Layman, neither his presence in Bullock's truck, his blood shot eyes and 
dilated pupils, his possession of paraphernalia and constructive possession of marijuana, nor 
his earlier use of drugs do not "make up for this critical lack of evidence." 1999 UT 71 at 
\\6. Accordingly, Wilkinson asks that this Court reverse his conviction for possession of 
i 
methamphetamine because there was not a sufficient nexus between him and the 
methamphetamine found in Bullock's vehicle to permit a factual inference that he had the 
power and the intent to exercise control over the drug(s). I 
' "
 :
 • " • " -
r : ;
 • ' • • . ; • • - . , i 
( 
i 
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I 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Wilkinson asks that this Court reverse his conviction of 
possession of methamphetamine and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District with 
instructions that he is to be immediately released from the Utah State Prison. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | ^day of June, 2001. 
Margaret^ P. Lindsay Q 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this _/2fday of June, 2001. 
'p\ **]A 4T /\mJ^ 
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JAMES G. CLARK USB #3637 
Attorney for Defendant 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)375-1717 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Criminal No. 981405492 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
/ 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, James G. Clark, pursuant to Rule 23, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for good cause appearing and upon grounds more fully set forth in 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, which supporting memorandum is 
filed contemporaneously herewith, hereby moves the Court to arrest judgment pending the review and 
resolution of these matters. 
DATED AND SIGNED this i £ _ day of May, 2000 IL nt 
2*±. iMzL 
JAMES<}. CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Motion to Arrest 
Judgment, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Kay Bryson 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 E. Center, Suite #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
DATED AND SIGNED this J j j ^ day of May, 2000. 
M W 
o 
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JAMES G. CLARK USB #3637 
Attorney for Defendant 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)375-1717 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
TN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, ARREST JUDGMENT 
vs. 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, 
Defendant. 
Criminal No. 981405492 
Judge: Ray Harding, Sr. 
/ 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, James G. Clark, and hereby files 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, and for good cause 
appearing asserts the following. 
On or about November 18, 1999, Defendant was tried in absentia and convicted of illegal 
possession of methamphetamine, illegal possession of marijuana, and illegal possession of drug 
paraphernalia. At the time of his arrest, Defendant was in actual possession of only drug 
paraphernalia; he was charged with and convicted of possession of the controlled substances 
under a theory of "constructive possession." 
The elements of constructive possession as set forth in State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1985) require a showing that there be a "sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to 
\ 
\ 
permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over the drug." Id. at 319; see also. State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). 
The court in Fox went on to elaborate on some of the factors that might support a charge 
of constructive possession: (1) incriminating statements made by the accused, (2) incriminating 
behavior of the accused, (3) presence of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had 
control, such as a closet or drawer containing the accused's clothing or other personal effects, and 
(4) presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which 
the accused has special control. Id. at 319-20. 
In this case, the State attempted to establish a sufficient nexus through eliciting testimony 
at trial that Defendant was situated nearest the drugs, that when he exited the back seat of the 
vehicle he "kicked" the drugs out onto the ground, and that he was in possession of drug 
paraphernalia. However, this showing of constructive possession was insufficient as a matter of 
law and should not have been a question to be determined by the finder of fact. 
Defendant never made any incriminating statements regarding knowledge, use, or 
possession of the subject methamphetamine. In fact, Steve Bullock, the owner and operator of 
the vehicle, plead guilty to a possession charge and admitted that the methamphetamine was his 
and not Defendant's. Bullock testified that Defendant was asleep in the uaCrt. seat of the vehicle 
and that when he was stopped by the patrol officer, Bullock threw the drugs into the back of the 
- 2 
car. Merely because Defendant was the person closest to the drugs and because they were found 
on the ground once he exited the vehicle is insufficient to establish that the methamphetamine was 
among his personal effects or in an area where he had specific control. 
Lastly, while Defendant's possession of paraphernalia may be an indicia of constructive 
possession, it cannot stand as the only evidence of Defendant's knowledge of the 
methamphetamine and intent to exercise dominion and control over the same. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and inasmuch as there was an insufficient nexus to establish 
constructive possession of the methamphetamine, the Court should grant Defendant's Motion to 
Arrest Judgment as the facts adduced do not support a public offense. 
DATED AND SIGNED this j ^ T d a y of May, 2000. 
-3K-
< S G. CLARK 
ftorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, postage prepaid, addressed 
follows: 
KayBryson 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 E. Center, Suite #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ . day of May, 2000. 
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FILED 
fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH. Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT U fl lo6 Ak Deoutv 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ * ~ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ARREST JUDGEMENT 
CASE NO. 981405492 
DATE: May 25,2000 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis 
The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and the facts of the case. Based on the 
facts, a jury could easily have found actual, physical possession of the drugs, as well as constructive possession. 
Numerous facts existed by which the jury could have determined that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
Defendant and the drugs to find him guilty, as set forth in the jury instructions and precedent case State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). These facts include but are not limited to the following: Defendant was found with a syringe 
at his feet in the vehicle; upon exiting the vehicle Defendant kicked the syringe and a spoon that tested positive for 
methamphetamine to the ground; Defendant attempted to recover the kicked syringe; upon arrest of the Defendant 
a used syringe was found in his pocket, which syringe Defendant admitted was his; and finally, the arresting officer 
found track marks on the Defendant's arms, in regard to which the Defendant told the officer that he had shot up 
earlier that day. 
This Court holds that the facts presented to the jury were sufficient to show a strong nexus between the 
Defendant and the drugs he was convicted of possessing, and the Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby 
DENIED. 
DATED this 2*4 day of May, 2000. 
Off/ A *™**y^ -- - ^ 
cc: Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
James Clark, Counsel for Defendant 
x . ^ — — • C /47 
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